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Abstract. From 16.09.2007 to 21.09.2007 the Dagstuhl Seminar 07381
Cryptography was held in the International Conference and Research
Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several partici-
pants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open prob-
lems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the sem-
inar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together
in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals
in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if
available.
Keywords. Cryptography, information security, public-key cryptogra-
phy, cryptographic protocols, security proofs
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0.1 Introduction and Motivation
Cryptography is of paramount importance for information security. Crypto-
graphic primitives are the core building blocks for constructing secure systems.
The last three decades have seen tremendous progress in cryptography and the
ﬁeld has substantially matured. Major achievements include the proposal of ad-
equate security deﬁnitions, of new cryptographic schemes, and of security proofs
for these schemes, relative to the security deﬁnition. As a consequence, cryp-
tography has shifted from an ad-hoc discipline with many interesting tricks and
ideas to a mathematically rigorous science. Despite this progress many essen-
tial problems in cryptography still remain open and new areas and topics arise
constantly. The ﬁeld is more lively than ever before.
While the number of scientiﬁc conferences focusing on cryptography is in-
creasing, most of these meetings have a broad focus, and due to a growing
interest by practitioners, the number of non-expert attendees has increased. As
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a result, it becomes more diﬃcult to discuss the details of the advancement of
the ﬁeld, as well as to identify promising innovative trends. Therefore, the aim
of the seminar was to provide an opportunity for key cryptographers to meet,
to interact, to focus on the scientiﬁc foundation of cryptography, to spot the
emerging new areas, and to work on them. Applications were also covered but
the emphasis was on the conceptual framework that allows the use of appropriate
models, amenable to mathematical reasoning.
0.2 Participation, Organization, and Atmosphere
The seminar brought together about 40 leading cryptographers from all over the
world. Almost all participants gave a presentation about their recent research
and also about future research plans they have, encouraging others to join in.
In many cases the choice of the subject for the talk was targeted to the unique
list of participants. The presentations were highly interactive and led to lively
discussions, well into the evenings and nights. A number of new collaborations
were initiated at the seminar. Overall, the seminar was a great success, as is also
documented by the feedback given by the participants on the questionnaires.
0.3 Summary of Topics
The topics covered in the seminar spanned most areas of cryptography, in one
way or another, both in terms of the types of schemes (public-key cryptogra-
phy, symmetric cryptography, hash functions and other cryptographic functions,
multi-party protocols, etc.) and in terms of the mathematical methods and tech-
niques used (algebra, number theory, elliptic curves, probability theory, infor-
mation theory, combinatorics, quantum theory, etc.). The range of applications
addressed in the various talks was broad, ranging from secure communication,
key management, authentication, digital signatures and payment systems to e-
voting and Internet security.
While the initial plan had been to focus more exclusively on public-key cryp-
tography, it turned out that this sub-topic branches out into many other areas
of cryptography and therefore the organizers decided to expand the scope, em-
phasizing quality rather than close adherence to public-key cryptography. This
decision turned out to be a wise one.
What was common to almost all the talks is that rigorous mathematical
proofs for the security of the presented schemes were given. In fact, a central
topic of many of the talks were proof methodologies for various contexts.
Keywords: Cryptography, information security, public-key cryptography, cryp-
tographic protocols, security proofs
Joint work of: Blömer, Johannes; Boneh, Dan; Cramer, Ronald; Maurer, Ueli
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1292
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New Techniques for Cryptanalysis of Hash Functions and
Improved Attacks on Snefru
Eli Biham (Technion - Haifa, IL)
In this talk we present new techniques for the cryptanalysis of hash functions
that allow the implementation of prior attacks with additional properties, and
to reach previously impossible results. The ﬁrst technique shows how to use
generic attacks within the scope of diﬀerential cryptanalysis, and in particular
the Floyd and Nivasch cycle detection and collision ﬁnding algorithms in order
to ﬁnd collisions. We use this technique to show the ﬁrst found collision of 3-pass
Snefru. The second technique uses virtual messages (that do not exist in practice)
with a second preimage attack in order to ﬁnd a preimage of the compression
function. We also observe how the padding scheme of the hash function aﬀects
the ability to ﬁnd preimages of the full hash function, and present a very long
preimage of Snefru.
Keywords: Hash functions, Snefru, diﬀerential cryptanalysis, collisions, preim-
ages
Space-Eﬃcient Identity Based Encryption Without
Pairings
Dan Boneh (Stanford University, USA)
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) systems are often constructed using bilinear
maps (a.k.a. pairings) on elliptic curves. One exception is an elegant system due
to Cocks which builds an IBE based on the quadratic residuosity problem modulo
an RSA composite N . The Cocks system, however, produces long ciphertexts.
Since the introduction of the Cocks system in 2001 it has been an open problem
to construct a space eﬃcient IBE system without pairings. In this paper we
present an IBE system in which ciphertext size is short: an encryption of an `-
bit message consists of a single element in ZN plus `+1 additional bits. Security,
as in the Cocks system, relies on the quadratic residuosity problem. The system
is based on the theory of ternary quadratic forms and as a result, encryption
and decryption are slower than in the Cocks system.
Keywords: Identity Based Encryption, Quadratic Residousity, Public-key cryp-
tography
Joint work of: Boneh, Dan; Gentry, Craig; Hamburg, Michael
Full Paper:
http://crypto.stanford.edu/∼dabo/abstracts/bgh.html
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A tour of set-up assumptions for obtaining UC security
Ran Canetti (IBM TJ Watson Research Center - Hawthorne, USA)
A desirable goal for cryptographic protocols is to guarantee security when the
protocol is composed with other protocol instances.
Universally Composable (UC) security provides this guarantee in a strong
sense: A UC-secure protocol maintains its security properties even when com-
posed concurrently with an unbounded number of instances of arbitrary proto-
cols. However, many interesting cryptographic tasks are provably impossible to
realize with UC security, unless some trusted set-up is assumed. Impossibility
holds even if ideally authenticated communication channels are provided.
The talk will examine and compare a number of set-up assumptions (models)
that were recently demonstrated to suﬃce for constructing UC-secure protocols
that realize practically any cryptographic task. We start with the common ref-
erence string (CRS) and key registration (KR) models. We then proceed to the
sunspot models, which allow for some adversarial control over the set-up, a
number of models which better captures set-up that is globally available in the
system, and a timing assumption.
Finally, we brieﬂy touch upon set-up models for obtaining authenticated
communication.
Keywords: Security analysis, composable security, set-up assumptions
Simulatable Veriﬁable Random Functions
Melissa Chase (Brown Univ. - Providence, USA)
We introduce simulatable veriﬁable random functions (sVRF). VRFs are similar
to pseudorandom functions, except that they are also veriﬁable: corresponding
to each seed sk , there is a public key pk , and for y = Fpk (x), it is possible to
prove that y is indeed the value of the function seeded by sk . A simulatable VRF
is a VRF for which this proof can be simulated, so a simulator can pretend that
the value of Fpk (x) is any y. We begin by introducing the notion and formal
deﬁnitions of sVRFs. (joint work with Anna Lysyanskaya.)
We then present a new construction of sVRFs. This construction uses an
asymmetric bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT . It is based on the SDHI assumption
in G1 and uses the Groth Sahai bilinear map commitment and proof system
(which can be based on either the SXDH or the decisional linear assumption).
The input domain must be polynomial size, and the output is pseudorandom over
G1. (joint work with Mira Belenkiy, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Anna Lysyanskaya).
Keywords: Veriﬁable Random Functions, Pseudorandom Functions
Joint work of: Belenkiy, Mira; Chase, Melissa; Kohlweiss, Markulf; Lysyan-
skaya, Anna
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Combinatorial authentication codes secure against
related-key attacks and their applications
Ronald Cramer (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
We introduce a class of combinatorial authentication codes that withstand cer-
tain related-key attacks. Consider the standard notion of security for combina-
torial authentication codes, i.e., security against impersonation and substitution
attacks. Our notion requires that security is guaranteed even if the attacker can
algebraically modify the secret key of the receiver.
We show that these codes have interesting applications to fuzzy randomness
extractors (which in turn are applicable in certain settings of biometric identiﬁ-
cation), secure message transmission and robust secret sharing.
Finally, we show how to construct nearly optimal combinatorial authentica-
tion codes secure against related-key attacks from certain classes of cyclic error
correcting codes.
Keywords: Cryptography, authentication codes, error correcting codes, ran-
domness extractors, secret sharing, secure message transmission, biometric iden-
tiﬁcation
Joint work of: Cramer, Ronald; Dodis, Yevgeniy; Fehr, Serge; Padro', Carles;
Wichs, Daniel
Applying Recreational Mathematics to Secure Multiparty
Computation
Yvo Desmedt (Univ. College London, GB)
The problem of a mouse traveling through a maze is well known. The maze
can be represented using a planar graph. We present a variant of the maze. We
consider a grid vertex colored planar graph in which an adversary can choose
up to t colors and remove all vertices that have these colors and their adjacent
edges. We call the grid in which these vertices and adjacent edges are removed a
reduced grid. The problem is that a mouse must be able to move in the reduced
grid from the ﬁrst row to the last row, and from the ﬁrst column to the last
column, and this for all possible reductions. We present three types of solutions
to construct such grids. The eﬃciency of these solutions is discussed.
The problem ﬁnds its origin in the problem of secure multiparty computation.
We consider the problem of parties each having a secret belonging to a non-
abelian group. The parties want to compute the product of these secrets without
leaking anything that does not follow trivially from the product. Our solution is
black box, i.e., independent of the non-abelian group. This has applications to
threshold block ciphers and post-quantum cryptography.
Keywords: Multi-party computation, private and reliable computation, non-
abelian groups
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Does Privacy Require True Randomness?
Yevgeniy Dodis (Courant Institute - New York, USA)
All known techniques for achieving privacy seem to fundamentally require (nearly)
perfect randomness. We ask the question whether this is just a coincidence, or,
perhaps, privacy inherently requires true randomness?
We resolve this question for the case of (information-theoretic) private-key
encryption, where parties wish to encrypt a b-bit value using an n-bit shared
secret key sampled from some imperfect source of randomness S. Our main result
shows that if such n-bit source S allows for a secure encryption of b bits, where b
> log n, then one can deterministically extract nearly b almost perfect random
bits from S.
Moreover, the restriction that b > log n is nearly tight.
Hence, to a large extent, true randomness is inherent for encryption: either
the key length must be exponential in the message length b, or one can de-
terministically extract nearly b almost unbiased random bits from the key. In
particular, ** the one-time pad scheme is essentially "universal" **
Our technique also extends to related *computational* primitives which are
"perfectly-binding", such as perfectly-binding commitment and computationally
secure private- or public-key encryption, showing the necessity to *eﬃciently*
extract almost b *pseudorandom* bits.
Keywords: Randomness, extraction, privacy, encryption
Joint work of: Dodis, Yevgeniy; Bosley, Carl
Full Paper:
http://people.csail.mit.edu/dodis/ps/enc-ext.ps
Randomness Extraction via Delta-Biased Masking in the
Presence of a Quantum Attacker
Serge Fehr (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
Randomness extraction is of fundamental importance for information-theoretic
cryptography.
It allows to transform a raw key about which an attacker has some limited
knowledge into a fully secure random key, on which the attacker has essentially
no information.
We show that randomness extraction by means of xor'ing a so-called delta-
biased mask to the raw key is secure also in case where the attacker has quantum
information on the raw key. Up to date, only very few techniques are known
to work against a quantum attacker, much in contrast to the classical (non-
quantum) setting, which is much better understood and for which a vast amount
of diﬀerent techniques for randomness extraction are known. We show how the
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new randomness-extraction technique allows to do error-correction without leak-
ing partial information to a quantum attacker. Such a technique is useful in
settings where the raw key may contain errors, since standard error-correction
techniques may provide the attacker with information on, say, a secret key that
was used to obtain the raw key.
An additional application, which I will not talk about, is to entropically
secure encryption.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, randomness extraction, small-biased sets
Joint work of: Fehr, Serge; Schaﬀner, Christian
On the Impossibility of Three-Move Blind Signature
Schemes
Marc Fischlin (TU Darmstadt, D)
We investigate the possibility to build blind signature schemes in which the
interactive signature issuing between the signer and the user can be achieved in
three (or less) moves. While such protocols are known to exist in the random
oracle model and the common reference string model, currently the best protocol
in the standard model by Okamoto requires four moves. Here we give indications
that schemes with three moves in the standard model are hard to achieve. This
also sheds some light on the hardness of instantiating the random oracles in the
schemes by Chaum and by Pointcheval and Stern.
Keywords: Blind signature scheme, black-box reduction
Joint work of: Fischlin, Marc; Schröder, Dominique
How to Share a Key
Matthias Fitzi (ETH Zürich, CH)
The problem of asynchronous perfectly secure communication via one-time pads
(OTP) has been recently introduced by Di Crescenzo and Kiayias.
There, several players share the same OTP to be used in parallel but it is not
known in advance which players will consume how many bits of the pad. Based
on the common OTP and only partial local knowledge of how many key bits
have already been used by each other player, the goal is to commonly consume
as many key bits as possible without any overlap.
In this paper, we consider a related problem with immediate implications to
the previous model. We consider n players to share the same k keys of length
bits. The goal is to assign a key sequence to each player such that, for as many
keys as possible and independently of which player uses how many of them, it
is guaranteed that all used keys are independent. Such an assignment is called
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loss-free if k keys can always be consumed independently. Note that, in contrast
to the previous model, the players are ignorant of each other's key consumptions.
We ﬁrst observe a simple loss-free solution for the case that the key is of certain
(small) minimal length . Furthermore, for the case of key length = 1 (the most
general case), we show that loss-free assignments are possible if and only if the
number of players is at most three. Our solutions directly apply to the model
of Di Crescenzo and Kiayias. For the case n = 3, we strictly improve over their
solution.
For n > 3, we still partially improve over their solution despite the fact that
our construction is simple and oblivious.
Keywords: How, loss-free, one-time pad, parallel use, perfect security
Joint work of: Fitzi, Matthias; Nielsen, Jesper Buus; Wolf, Stefan
Security Under Key-Dependent Inputs
Shai Halevi (IBM TJ Watson Research Center - Yorktown Heights, USA)
In this work we re-visit the question of building cryptographic primitives that
remain secure even when queried on inputs that depend on the secret key.
This was investigated by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton in the context of
randomized encryption schemes and in the random oracle model. We extend
the investigation to deterministic symmetric schemes (such as PRFs and block
ciphers) and to the standard model. We term this notion "security against key-
dependent-input attack, or KDI-security for short. Our motivation for studying
KDI security is the existence of signiﬁcant real-world implementations of deter-
ministic encryption (in the context of storage encryption) that actually rely on
their building blocks to be KDI secure.
We consider many natural constructions for PRFs, ciphers, tweakable ci-
phers and randomized encryption, and examine them with respect to their KDI
security. We exhibit inherent limitations of this notion and show many natural
constructions that fail to be KDI secure in the standard model, including some
schemes that have been proven in the random oracle model. On the positive side,
we demonstrate examples where some measure of KDI security can be provably
achieved (in particular, we show such examples in the standard model).
Keywords: Circular encryption, Key-dependent input, Self encryption
Joint work of: Halevi, Shai; Krawczyk, Hugo
Full Paper:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/315
See also: ACM-CCS 2007
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Towards Key-Dependent Message Security in the Standard
Model
Dennis Hofheinz (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
Standard security notions for encryption schemes do not guarantee any security
if the encrypted messages depend on the secret key. Yet it is exactly the stronger
notion of security in the presence of *key-dependent* messages (KDM security)
that is required in a number of applications: most prominently, KDM security
plays an important role in analyzing cryptographic multi-party protocols in a
formal calculus. But although often assumed, the mere existence of KDM secure
schemes is an open problem. The only previously known construction was proven
secure in the random oracle model.
We present symmetric encryption schemes that are KDM secure in the stan-
dard model (i.e., without random oracles). The price we pay is that we achieve
only a relaxed (but still useful) notion of key-dependent message security. Our
work answers (at least partially) an open problem posed by Black, Rogaway,
and Shrimpton. More concretely, our contributions are as follows: - We present
a (stateless) symmetric encryption scheme that is information-theoretically se-
cure in face of a *bounded* number and length of encryptions for which the
messages depend in an arbitrary way on the secret key. - We present a state-
ful symmetric encryption scheme that is computationally secure in face of an
arbitrary number of encryptions for which the messages depend only on the re-
spective *current* secret state/key of the scheme. The underlying computational
assumption is minimal: we assume the existence of one-way functions. - We give
evidence that the only previously known KDM secure encryption scheme cannot
be proven secure in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles).
Keywords: Key-dependent message security, security
Joint work of: Hofheinz, Dennis; Unruh, Dominique
MPC in the Head
Yuval Ishai (Technion - Haifa, IL)
I will survey a recent approach for designing secure two-party protocols via the
use of secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols.
The ﬁrst part of the talk (joint work with Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky,
and Amit Sahai) will describe a way to obtain a zero-knowledge proof for a given
NP language by making a black-box use of any MPC protocol for a related n-
party functionality. The latter protocol only needs to be secure against a small
number of "honest-but-curious" parties. This new connection allows us to draw
on a large body of techniques for MPC with honest majority in order to improve
the eﬃciency of zero-knowledge proofs.
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The second part of the talk (ongoing joint work with Danny Harnik, Eyal
Kushilevitz, and Jesper Nielsen) will describe a new general connection between
MPC and OT combiners that has applications to the eﬃciency of secure two-
party computation.
Keywords: Secure multiparty computation, zero-knowledge proofs, oblivious
transfer
Twinning Diﬃe and Hellman
Eike Kiltz (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
We propose the strong twin Diﬃe-Hellman assumption, a new interactive as-
sumption that we prove weaker than the standard Diﬃe-Hellman (DH) assump-
tion. We use it to construct the ﬁrst redudancy-free public-key encryption scheme
based on the DH assumption. We ﬁnd several other applications for these ideas,
including non-interactive authenticated key exchange, securing password authen-
ticated key exchange against server compromise, and redundancy-free identity-
based encryption.
Keywords: Diﬃe-Hellman problem, Twin Diﬃe-Hellman problem, redundancy-
free public-key encryption
Joint work of: Cash, David; Kiltz, Eike; Shoup, Victor
Cryptography in Constant Parallel Time
Eyal Kushilevitz (Technion - Haifa, IL)
The talk gives a survey of the recent line of work on the subject.
In particular, we are interested in implementing cryptographic primitives in
the complexity class NC0, that consists of all functions where each output bit
depends on a constant number of input bits. We are also interested in implemen-
tations where each input bit depends on a constant number of output bits and
implementations that simultaneously achieve both properties. Such implemen-
tations are of interest both from the theoretical point of view and for obtaining
parallel cryptography.
Among other things, we prove that any implementation of basic crypto-
graphic primitives (such as one-way function, pseudorandom generators, encryp-
tion and more) in the complexity class NC1 (such implementations exist under
most common cryptographic assumptions, like the intractability of factoring)
implies an NC0 implementation for those primitives.
Keywords: Parallel cryptography, one-way functions, pseudorandom generators
Joint work of: Kushilevitz, Eyal; AppleBaum, Benny; Ishai, Yuval
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Random systems
Ueli Maurer (ETH Zürich, CH)
Most cryptographic systems can be modeled as a discrete system which inter-
acts with its environment by taking a sequence of inputs and producing, for
each new input, an output. The number of interactions can be ﬁxed (e.g. one)
or unbounded. In most contexts, only the *observable* input-output behavior of
a system, but not the internal state representation, is of interest. For example,
if one considers the distinguishing advantage of a certain distinguisher D for
two systems F and G, then all that matters is the input-output behavior of the
systems D, F and G. The abstraction capturing the input-output behavior of a
system is called a random system and is, mathematically, a sequence of condi-
tional probability distributions. This is in the same spirit as a communication
channel in communication theory is abstracted as a conditional probability dis-
tribution PY |X of the output Y, given the input X, independently of the physical
description of the channel.
One purpose of an abstraction is to make statements and proofs at the same
time simpler, more general, and more elegant. In this talk we explore the power
of the abstraction of random systems in cryptography.
Keywords: Cryptography, indistinguishability, random systems, security am-
pliﬁcation
An Optimal RSA Broadcast Attack
Alexander May (TU Darmstadt, D)
We address the problem of polynomial time solving univariate modular equations
with mutually co-prime moduli. For a given system of equations we determine
up to which size the common roots can be calculated eﬃciently. We further de-
termine the minimum number of equations which suﬃces for a recovery of all
common roots. The result that we obtain is superior to Hastad's original RSA
broadcast attack, even when Hastad's method is combined with the best known
lattice technique due to Coppersmith. Namely, our reduction uses a slightly dif-
ferent transformation from polynomial systems to a single polynomial. Thus, our
improvement is achieved by optimal polynomial modelling rather than improved
lattice techniques. Moreover, we show by a counting argument that our results
cannot be improved in general. A typical application for our algorithm is an im-
proved attack on RSA with a smaller number of polynomially related messages.
Keywords: Univariate modular polynomial equations, RSA
Joint work of: May, Alexander; Ritzenhofen, Maike
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Precise Cryptography
Rafael Pass (Cornell University - Ithaca, USA)
The seminal work of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoﬀ put forward a computa-
tional approach to knowledge in interactive systems, providing the foundation
of modern Cryptography. Their notion, and its reﬁnement by Goldriech, Micali
and Wigderson, bounds the knowledge of a player in terms of his *potential*
computational power, technically deﬁned as its worst-case running-time. We put
forward a stronger notion that precisely bounds the knowledge gained by a player
in an interaction in terms of the *actual* computation it has performed in that
*particular* interaction.
Our approachwhich is exempliﬁed in the contexts of zero-knowledge proofs,
proofs of knowledge, encryption and secure computation-not only remains
valid even if P= NP, but is most meaningful when modeling knowledge of com-
putationally easy properties.
Keywords: Zero Knowledge, Precision, Proofs of Knowledge, Encryption
Joint work of: Pass, Rafael; Micali, Silvio
Generic Attacks and Proofs of Security for the Xor of
Random Permutations
Jacques Patarin (University of Versailles, F)
Xoring the output of k permutations, k >= 2, is a very simple way to construct
pseudo-random functions from pseudo-random permutations.
In this talk we will be present the best known attacks on this construction,
and the best known security results.
When k = 2 we will present a proof of security in O(2n) based on the "coef-
ﬁcients H technique".
Moreover, when k >= 3 we will see that if a few points are changed in the
output, we obtain a construction that seems to be even much more secure, and
that is still very simple to implement.
Keywords: Pseudorandom functions, pseudorandom permutations, security
beyond the birthday bound, Luby-Rackoﬀ backwards, generic attacks
Black-Box Combiners for Collision Resistance Really don't
Exist
Krzysztof Pietrzak (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
A black-box combiner for collision resistant hash functions (CRHF) is a construc-
tion which given black-box access to two hash functions is collision resistant if
at least one of the components is collision resistant.
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In this paper we prove a lower bound on the output length of black-box
combiners for CRHFs.
The bound we prove is tight as it is achieved by a recent construction of
Canetti et al [crypto'07]. Previously known lower bounds only applied to re-
stricted constructions which either were deterministic (Boneh, Boyen [crypto'06],
Pietrzak [eurocrypt'07]), or for constructions whose security proof required that
the underlying hash-functions can be broken given a single collision for the com-
biner (Canetti et al [crypto'07]). Our proof uses a lemma similar to the elegant
reconstruction lemma of Gennaro and Trevisan [focs'00], which states that any
function which is not one-way is compressible (and thus uniformly random func-
tion must be one-way). In a similar vein we show that a function which is not
collision resistant is compressible.
We also borrow ideas from recent work by Haitner et al. [FOCS'07], who show
how to prove the reconstruction lemma even relative to a powerful collision-
ﬁnding oracle.
Keywords: CRHF, combiner
Universal Hash Functions are Not So Universal
Bart Preneel (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, B)
In this talk we demonstrate some very simple key recovery attacks on several
universal hash function based MAC algorithms. The attacks use a substantial
number of veriﬁcation queries and in some cases require nonce reuse; this is
realistic in settings in which the receiver is stateless or the nonce is a random
number. Some of these attacks exploit weak keys, while others can make use of
partial information on a secret key, for example, due to a side channel attack.
These results show that while universal hash functions oﬀer provable security,
high speeds and parallelism, their simple combinatorial properties make them
less robust than conventional message authentication primitives.
Keywords: Universal hash functions, message authentication codes, key recov-
ery, cryptanalysis, side channel attacks
Joint work of: Preneel, Bart; Handschuh, Helena
Formalizing Human Ignorance + Permutation-Based
Cryptographic Hashing
Phillip Rogaway (Univ. of California - Davis, USA)
The talk is of two unrelated parts. PART 1: There is a rarely mentioned foun-
dational problem involving collision-resistant hash-functions: common construc-
tions are keyless, while formal deﬁnitions are keyed.
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The discrepancy stems from the fact that a function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
always admits an eﬃcient collision-ﬁnding adversary, it just that us humans
are too dumb to ﬁnd it. I explain that there's a simple and "almost known"
way to sidestep this diﬃculty that avoids having to key the hash function: just
state theorems in a way that prescribes an explicitly given reduction, normally
a black-box one. PART 2: I discussed very recent work on how to construct a
cryptographic hash function producing n or more output bits from a random
permutation from n bits to n bits. The main construction, PHASH, can, for
example, map 2n bits to n bits using three permutation calls, getting security
close to the 2n/2. We also show that this number of permutation calls, three, is
necessary as well as suﬃcient for 2→ 1 compression. More generally, we provide
a matrix-parameterized construction, PHASH, for compressing mn bits to rn
bits for any m > r ≥ 1; and we look at lower bounds (attacks) on what is
possible for permutation-based hashing with k calls.




Applying Cryptographylottery, anonymous authentication
and voting
Kazue Sako (NEC - Kawasaki, J)
We discuss several trials of applying cryptography to the real world, on a belief
that it would beneﬁt people. The examples include fair digital lootery, anony-
mous authentication such as group signatures to enhance user privacy, and voting
over network. We further present a new privacy requirement that we faced on
designing a network voting for nominating best paper award at a symposium,
which deals with privacy of not voters but of candidates in the voting.
Keywords: Privacy, fairness, voting, anonymity
A Tight High-Order Entropic Quantum Uncertainty
Relation with Applications
Christian Schaﬀner (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
We derive a new entropic quantum uncertainty relation involving min-entropy.
The relation is tight and can be applied in various quantum-cryptographic set-
tings.
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Protocols for quantum 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer and quantum Bit Com-
mitment are presented and the uncertainty relation is used to prove the secu-
rity of these protocols in the bounded-quantum-storage model according to new
strong security deﬁnitions.
As another application, we consider the realistic setting of Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) against quantum-memory-bounded eavesdroppers.
The uncertainty relation allows to prove the security of QKD protocols in this
setting while tolerating considerably higher error rates compared to the standard
model with unbounded adversaries. For instance, for the six-state protocol with
one-way communication, a bit-ﬂip error rate of up to 17% can be tolerated
(compared to 13% in the standard model).
Our uncertainty relation also yields a lower bound on the min-entropy key un-
certainty against known-plaintext attacks when quantum ciphers are composed.
Previously, the key uncertainty of these ciphers was only known with respect to
Shannon entropy.
Keywords: Quantum cryptgraphy, quantum uncertainty relations, information
theory, bounded-quantum-storage model




See also: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2007, Springer LNCS 4622, pages
360-378, 2007
Identiﬁcation and Signatures Based on NP-hard Problems
of Quadratic Forms
Claus Peter Schnorr (Universität Frankfurt, D)
A symmetric matrix A = At ∈ Zn×n deﬁnes the quadratic form xtAx. The
forms A0, A1 ∈ Zn×n are equivalent if T tA0T = A1 holds for some T ∈ GLn(Z).
We present public key identiﬁcation and digital signatures that provide proofs
of knowledge of an equivalence transform T ∈ GLn(Z).
Importantly, solving T tA1T = A0 for a "small" T is NP-hard for indeﬁnite
forms A1, A0 ∈ Zn×n for every ﬁxed n ≥ 3. This is a non trivial consequence
of the NP-hardness of binary quadratic equations over the integers of [MA78].
Small dimension n yields short private and public keys and eﬃcient protocols.
The NP-hardness holds for isotropic and for anisotropic forms.
While the computational equivalence problem has many easy instances for
isotropic forms no easy instances are known for anisotropic forms.
Proof of knowledge. Prover P proves to veriﬁer V knowledge of S such that
StA1S = A0 by iterating:
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1. P computes and sends an LLL-reduced form A′ := T tA0T for a randomized
T ∈ GLn(Z), see [HS07].
2. V sends a random one-bit challenge b ∈R {0, 1},
3. P sends the reply Rb := SbT ∈ GLn(Z), and V checks that RtbAbRb = A′.
If a fraudulent P˜ succeeds with A˜′ and replies R˜b for both R˜0, R˜1 he gets an
equivalent private key S′ := R˜1R˜−10 satisfying S
′tA1S′ = A0. This protocol is
statistical zeroknowledge under reasonable heuristics.
Another proof of knowledge uses, long challenges and can be transformed into
an eﬃcient public key signature scheme by replacing V through a cryptographic
hash function. This proof represents some c ∈ Z as xtAbx = c = ytA′y. As
the knowledge of such x,y reduce the dimension n of the unknown part of the
equivalence transform T by 1 we require that n ≥ 4.
References. [Ca78] presents the classical theory of rational quadratic forms,
for LLL-reduction of quadratic forms see [S07, Si05].
Keywords: Identiﬁcation, signature, quadratic form, proof of knowledge, zero-
knowledge, NP-hardness
Eﬃcient Implementation of Pairing Based Cryptosystems
Tsuyoshi Takagi (Future University - Hakodate, J)
Pairing based cryptosystems can accomplish novel security applications such as
ID-based cryptosystems, eﬃcient broadcast encryptions and so on, which have
not been constructed eﬃciently without the pairing.
Recently some eﬃcient algorithms for computing the pairing have been pro-
posed, namely Duursma-Lee algorithm and its variant ηT pairing.
In this talk, we present some implementation of the ηT pairing over diﬀerent
computation platforms. Our processing speeds of the ηT pairing over GF (397)
are as follows: 479 microseconds on AMD Opteron at 2.2GHz, 215 milliseconds
on NTT FOMA SH903iS (JAVA mobilephone), 38 milliseconds on ARM9 at
225MHz using BREW, 27 microseconds on FPGA Altera Cyclone II EP2C35 at
147 MHz, and 5.8 seconds on ATmega128L at 7.37 MHz using TinyOS, respec-
tively.
Keywords: Pairing, implementation
Statistically Hiding Commitments and Statistical
Zero-Knowledge Arguments from any One-Way Function
Salil Vadhan (Harvard University, USA)
We give a construction of statistically hiding commitment schemes (ones where
the hiding property holds against even computationally unbounded adversaries)
under the minimal complexity assumption that one-way functions exist.
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Consequently, one-way functions suﬃce to give statistical zero-knowledge ar-
guments for any NP statement (whereby even a computationally unbounded
adversarial veriﬁer learns nothing other than the fact the assertion being proven
is true, and a polynomial-time adversarial prover cannot convince the veriﬁer
of a false statement). These results resolve an open question posed by Naor,
Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and Yung (CRYPTO `92, J. Cryptology `98).
Keywords: Cryptography, statistically hiding commitments, statistical zero-
knowledge argument systems, one-way functions, interactive hashing
Joint work of: Haitner, Iftach; Nguyen, Minh; Ong, Shien Jin; Reingold, Omer;
Vadhan, Salil
See also: FOCS 06 paper by Nguyen, Ong, and Vadhan, and STOC 07 paper
by Haitner and Reingold.
E-passports
Serge Vaudenay (EPFL - Lausanne, CH)
Passports are documents that help immigration oﬃcers to identify people. In or-
der to strongly authenticate their data and to automatically identify people, they
are now equipped with RFID chips. These contain private information, biomet-
rics, and a digital signature by issuing authorities. Although they substantially
increase security at the border controls, they also come with new security and
privacy issues.
It is a well established fact that the basic access control (which is also used for
symmetric key agreement) is pretty weak. It resists neither passive avesdropping
nor online bruteforce attack. The European extension is better (based on Diﬃe-
Hellman with authenticated keys) but not quite enough since the hash of ﬁles
leaks.
One of the main privacy threat comes from the so-called passive authenti-
cation process which discloses digital evidence for private data authentication.
Indeed, by accessing to the e-passport, anyone can get a digital signature from
government authorities of a facial picture together with a name, a date of birth,
and a citizenship. Future extensions will include extra private data. We sug-
gest to ﬁx passive authentication by using Zero-Knowledge proof of signature
knowledge based on the Guillou-Quisquater protocol. This makes it possible to
authenticate data while leaking no transferable evidence.
Keywords: RFID, travel documents, security, privacy
Joint work of: Monnerat, Jean; Vaudenay, Serge; Vuagnoux, Martin;
Full Paper:
http://lasecwww.epﬂ.ch/php_code/publications/search.php?ref=MVV07
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Group message authentication
Douglas Wikström (KTH Stockholm, S)
Group signatures is a powerful primitive with many practical applications, al-
lowing a group of parties to share a signature functionality, while protecting the
anonymity of the signer.
However, despite intensive research in the past years, there is still no fully
satisfactory implementation of group signatures. The schemes proposed so far
are either too ineﬃcient to be used in practice, or their security is based on
rather strong, non-standard assumptions.
We observe that for some applications the full power of group signatures is
not necessary. For example, a group signature can be veriﬁed by any third party,
while in many applications such an universal veriﬁability is not needed or even
not desired.
Motivated by this observation, we propose a notion of group message authen-
tication, which can be viewed as a relaxation of group signatures. Group mes-
sage authentication enjoys the group-oriented features of group signatures, while
dropping some of the features which are not needed in many real-life scenarios.
An example application of group message authentication is an implementation
of an anonymous credit card.
We present a generic implementation of group message authentication, and
also propose an eﬃcient concrete implementation based on standard assump-
tions, namely strong RSA and DDH.
Keywords: Group signatures, anonymous credit cards, weaker assumptions
Joint work of: Wikström, Douglas; Przydatek, Bartosz
Relativistic Cryptography
Stefan Wolf (ETH Zürich, CH)
It has been observed that protocols for quantum key agreement can exist the
security of which is provable under the assumption that quantum OR relativity
theory is correct. More precisely, such schemes rely on the phenomenon of non-
locality and on the non-signaling principle of relativity. A practical aspect is
that the security is device-independent and holds whatever quantum systems are
operated on. In the quest of ﬁnding eﬃcient protocols of this kind, we discuss two
new, pessimistic, results: First, binary quantum non-locality cannot be distilled,
and second, there is no ampliﬁcation of non-signaling privacy.
Keywords: (Post-) Quantum cryptography, device-independent security, rela-
tivity.
Joint work of: Wolf, Stefan; Dukaric, Dejan; Haenggi, Esther
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Secure Multi-Party Multiplication with Low
Communication
Robbert de Haan (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
Multi-party computation based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme has two im-
portant drawbacks; the communication required is rather high and the ﬁeld-size
is dictated by the number of participants, which in turn increases the commu-
nication complexity as the ﬁeld size grows with the number of participants. In
this talk we give a survey of the recent advances towards alleviating these issues,
mainly focusing on the non-amortized solutions.
The ﬁrst construction that tackles the communication problem is due to
Franklin and Yung, who present a variant of Shamir's scheme that allows to
perform many multiplications in parallel at the cost of a single multiplication.
At Eurocrypt'07, Cramer, Damgaard and de Haan present another variant
that allows to perform multiplications in a ﬁnite ﬁeld requiring only operations
and communication over a subﬁeld, thus reducing the communication cost of a
single multiplication, as opposed to the Franklin and Yung approach where only
the communication cost of many multiplications performed in parallel can be
reduced.
At Crypto'06 Chen and Cramer introduced a generalization of Shamir's
scheme based on algebraic geometric coding theory. This approach has the ad-
vantage that it allows a number of participants much larger than the ﬁeld size,
and in fact multi-party computation can be performed over constant-sized ﬁelds
for inﬁnitely many settings of parameters.
At Eurocrypt'07, Chen et al. demonstrate an alternative solution that re-
places Shamir's scheme with a scheme based on error correcting codes, where
the general parameters of the code determine the parameters of the secret shar-
ing scheme. This approach has the advantage that it can be applied for arbitrary
ﬁeld sizes, i.e., constructions over binary ﬁelds are possible, but only schemes
with a regular multiplication property can be achieved in this way.
We also discuss our latest results, which include a very clean and basic re-
placement of the scheme due to Cramer, Damgaard and de Haan and its gener-
alization over algebraic geometric curves.
Keywords: Secure multiplication, multi-party computation, ramp sharing schemes
Joint work of: de Haan, Robbert; Cascudo, Ignacio; Chen, Hao; Cramer,
Ronald; Damgaard, Ivan; Goldwasser, Shaﬁ; Vaikuntanathan, Vinod
